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Abstract: The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications services 
distinguishes between markets that are susceptible to ex ante regulation and those that 
are subject to competition law alone. The paper lays out the methodology for identifying 
relevant markets that may be considered for ex ante regulation. It also provides a 
summary of the relevant markets that should be susceptible to ex ante regulation based 
on an analysis of conditions likely to prevail in a ‘representative" member state. The paper 
finally addresses the role of the European Commission, and in particular its Relevant 
Markets Recommendation, as a means of providing guidance to NRAs. 
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he EU regulatory framework for electronic communications services 
distinguishes between markets that are susceptible to ex ante 
regulation and those that are subject to competition law alone. The 
set of markets that are considered for ex ante regulation will change over 
time as new technologies are implemented, network architectures change, 
costs decrease, old products disappear and new ones are launched. A 
periodic review of the set of markets is required. 
T 
The paper lays out the methodology of identifying the relevant markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. The methodology is primarily guided by the 
objective to promote competition through remedying market failures created 
by a substantial degree of market power, where competition law alone is not 
sufficient. It is also consistent with the objective of applying ex ante 
regulation only in cases where there is a significant benefit to end-users that 
                     
(*) The paper benefits from work carried out with Martin Cave and Tommaso Valletti for the 
Economic Experts Report. Cf. CAVE M., STUMPF U. & VALLETTI T., A Review of Certain 
Markets Included in the Commission's Recommendation on Relevant Markets Subject to ex 
ante Regulation, an Independent Report, Brussels, June 2006. The two first sections of the 
paper draw partially on the Report. Remaining errors are the author’s sole responsibility. 
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cannot be achieved under competition law alone. The paper also  
summarises the results of applying the methodology to market conditions 
likely to prevail in a "representative" member state. The list of markets 
proposed in the Economic Experts Report is also compared with that 
proposed by the Commission in the draft revised Recommendation 1. 
Finally. the role of the European Commission is examined, and in particular 
its Relevant Markets Recommendation. Since the Recommendation is 
based on conditions prevailing in a "representative" member state, it may not 
provide the right guidance in all cases. The paper concludes by a number of 
suggestions as to how this problem can be dealt with. 
  Identifying relevant markets susceptible  
to ex ante regulation 
The methodology of identifying relevant markets susceptible to ex ante 
regulation must be guided by clear objectives. The primary objective of ex 
ante regulation is to promote competition by addressing high levels of 
market power in cases where competition law alone is not sufficient. 
Ultimately, any ex ante regulation should provide benefits for end-users by 
making retail markets more competitive. The benefit to end-users of any 
such regulatory intervention should be higher than the costs associated with 
the regulation.  
Where ex ante regulation is justified, it should be limited to the minimum 
extent necessary to remedy the competition problems. Ex ante regulation 
should target the source(s) of the competition problems in the value chain. It 
should be imposed where the least replicable assets are found 2, i.e., 
                     
1 For the initial Recommendation see Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003 on Relevant 
Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante 
regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and 
services, Brussels, 11/02/2003, C(2003)497. At the time of writing this paper, the revised 
Recommendation was still in public consultation. See Commission Staff Working Document: 
Public Consultation on a Draft Commission Recommendation On Relevant Product and Service 
Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services, Brussels, 
June 28th 2006. 
2 Another approach proposed in the Economic Experts Report is to start with the functionally 
least inclusive asset. 
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usually at the deepest possible level of access, and only extended 
downstream if ex ante regulation of the upstream market(s) is not sufficient 
to remedy the market failure.  
Defining relevant markets 
The EU regulatory framework addresses competition failures in economic 
markets, i.e., relevant markets defined on the basis of demand and supply 
side substitutability. It is instructive to imagine each value chain giving rise to 
a sequence of relevant retail and wholesale markets, where a relevant 
wholesale market can also be related to more than one value chain 3. It is 
not our objective to go through the methodology of market definition, which 
is treated elsewhere in depth 4; rather we will highlight a number of issues 
that are specific to market definition in the electronic communications sector. 
Relevant retail markets 
Clustering 
Economies of scope on the supply side and transactional economies on 
the demand side provide a strong incentive for suppliers and customers to 
offer and purchase services as a bundle. Some form of bundling is the rule 
rather than the exception. Fixed narrowband access is often combined with 
fixed calls, and mobile access is usually bundled with mobile calls. Fixed 
broadband access is bundled with internet alone ("high-speed internet 
access"), or together with internet and voice services (termed "double-play") 
or together with TV, internet and voice services (termed "triple-play").  
However, even although bundles of services are traded, rather than 
individual components, this does not necessarily justify defining a relevant 
market for a comprehensive cluster of services. Customers who purchase a 
bundle of services from a single supplier may switch to purchasing individual 
components from several suppliers if the price of the bundle were increased. 
If customers react strongly enough in that way, the bundle will not create a 
                     
3 Unbundled local loops, for example, are an input for fixed narrowband and fixed broadband 
access and services. 
4 See, for instance, Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of 
significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services (2002/C 165/03). 
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separate relevant market in the competition law sense; instead the 
components will be part of distinct relevant markets. 
The first issue here is whether customers can actually purchase the 
components separately and from different suppliers. In the absence of 
"unbundling requirements" at the retail level, operators will usually bundle 
access with services provided over the connection. This is obviously the 
case for mobile services, where mobile operators offer mobile access 
together with calls and SMS, as well as international roaming. The relevant 
market is a broader cluster market 5. This not the case for fixed telephony 
services where incumbents are obliged to offer carrier selection (CS) to end-
users as well as wholesale call origination to alternative network operators to 
enable CS calls. Furthermore, incumbents usually also have to offer DSL 
connections as a stand-alone product and separate from internet, voice or 
TV services. 
Where components can be purchased separately, a second issue is 
whether customers would switch in significant numbers from the bundle to 
purchasing the components in case of a price increase for the bundle. A 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test is likely to show that many bundles do not give 
rise to a distinct relevant market: if the price of a fixed telephony bundle 
combining access and calls were increased above its competitive level, 
customers would switch to buying access and calls from separate suppliers. 
Fixed narrowband access and calls obviously are separate relevant markets. 
Similarly, if the price of a multi-play bundle were increased, customers would 
switch to purchasing the individual components from several suppliers. Multi-
play products are unlikely to constitute new relevant markets; rather the 
components are likely to be part of the markets for voice, internet and TV 
services. It is worth noting that this may not hold for multi-play bundles 
where terminal devices and networks are fully integrated (for example, for 
fixed-mobile integrated services). 
Two-sided platforms 
The scope of fixed and mobile services clusters is also limited by 
interdependencies among users. When defining relevant markets, the two-
sided nature of electronic communications platforms which involves callers 
                     
5 Note that incoming mobile calls are not part of the mobile services cluster nor are incoming 
fixed calls part of the fixed services cluster. This is addressed further below. 
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and receivers has to be taken into account 6. It is not always possible to 
examine price effects on one side of the platform without considering the 
effect on the other side. Depending on the billing arrangement, i.e., whether 
the calling party or the receiving party or both pay for a call, competitive 
constraints on the originating or terminating provider of the call can differ. 
Let us first consider outgoing calls. Due to Calling Party Pays (CPP), it is 
generally the calling party, which pays the full charge of the call and the 
receiver typically accepts all calls. The receiver will only be negatively 
affected if the sender makes less and shorter calls as a result of an increase 
in the price of outgoing calls, but this effect may be difficult to discern by 
receivers. The behaviour of receivers is unlikely to impose constraints on the 
pricing of outgoing calls. Hence, outgoing calls to end-users can be analysed 
independently from the receiving side.  
Under CPP call termination is purchased on a wholesale basis by the 
originating operator from the terminating operator. The wholesale 
termination price is incorporated into the retail price charged by the 
originating operator to the calling customer. One may say that under CPP 
the terminating operator charges the price for the incoming call (although 
indirectly) to the caller. CPP leads to an externality and monopolisation 
problem for incoming off-net calls that must be analysed separately from 
outgoing calls (and access).  
The case of on-net calls is fundamentally different from off-net calls. Here 
an operator charges the price of incoming calls to its own subscribers. In 
case of on-net calls the platform is internalising externalities between the 
calling and receiving side. The presence of alternative networks can 
constrain the ability of an operator to raise the price of incoming on-net calls 
and create competitive conditions that are different from incoming off-net 
calls. This is why incoming on-net calls should be analysed separately from 
incoming off-net calls, but may be treated together with outgoing calls. 
Chain substitution 
Electronic communications services are provided to end-users in a range 
of service qualities and price options. In particular, where competition is 
                     
6 See also VALETTI T. (2006), "Mobile Call Termination: a Tale of Two-Sided Markets", 
COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, no. 61, 1st Q. 2006, pp. 61-77. For a recent survey on 
the theory of two-sided markets, see ROCHET J.-C. & TIROLE J., "Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report", 2005. 
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intense, product and price differentiation is often such that the product and 
price options offered give rise to a chain of substitution. Even though there is 
no substitutability between high-quality and low-quality products, or between 
high-user and low-user price plans, chain substitution across the range of 
quality and tariff options is often strong enough to justify the definition of a 
single relevant market.  
This is usually the case for mobile narrowband services (ranging from 
prepaid light-user tariffs to contract high-user tariffs). Another example is 
fixed national calls, where optional tariffs offer lower per-minute rates for an 
extra fixed monthly charge, usually creating chain substitution across the 
range of tariff options.  
There is also likely to be chain substitution across the range of 
transmission speeds for internet services or for bandwidths of retail leased 
lines. It is worth noting, however, that there seems to be a gap in the chain 
of substitution between dial-up narrowband internet and broadband internet 
because of differences in the nature of access provided (in particular 
because of the "always on" feature of the latter). Similarly, for retail leased 
lines, the chain seems to be interrupted at 2 Mbs or 10 Mbs. Pricing 
evidence shows that it is not economically efficient to use multiples of lower 
capacity leased lines as "building blocks" to respond to a price increase for 
higher bandwidth leased lines. The break is related to differences in 
competitive conditions: while lower capacity leased lines are predominantly 
provided over copper access networks giving the fixed incumbent an 
advantage, higher capacity leased lines are provided over fibre networks 
where there is also some investment by alternative operators. 
Relevant wholesale markets 
Substitution between wholesale services provided  
at different levels of access 
As a general point, wholesale services at two adjacent levels of access 
are usually not short-run demand or supply side substitutes. In other words, 
there is no chain substitution across the value chain, either downwards or 
upwards. 
Switching from higher to lower level access necessitates some form of 
network build-out. Given the economies of scale, scope and density, as well 
as the sunk costs involved in network build-out, an operator is unlikely to 
switch to a lower level of access within a short period of 6-12 months purely 
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as a result of a price increase for the higher level access. Of course, 
operators build out networks and migrate to deeper levels of access, but 
only once they have reached the necessary critical scale in terms of number 
and density of customers and volume of traffic. The prime driver for network 
build-out is growth in customer bases and traffic volume, which allows the 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope when the operator itself is 
providing the input. 
Operators would also not switch from a lower level to a higher level of 
access given the stranded investment. Clearly, a price increase for a lower 
level access service is unlikely to make an operator "build" back its network 
in the short or medium run. 
As a result, there is a sequence of distinct wholesale markets across the 
value chain. For example, for broadband, the sequence is national – regional 
– local (e.g. DSLAM) broadband access – ULL. Similarly, for fixed 
narrowband calls, the sequence is national – regional – local call origination 
– ULL.  
Notional wholesale markets 
Wholesale remedies can be imposed on operators which have SMP in a 
wholesale market susceptible to ex ante regulation. This creates a 
conceptual problem in cases where access to a particular wholesale service 
is considered to be necessary to ensure competition, but this service is not 
yet provided. A commercial wholesale product may not be made available in 
the absence of ex ante regulation, because the dominant firm(s) may have 
no interest in providing new entrants with an input needed to compete. For 
example, it is questionable whether incumbents would provide wholesale 
access to ULLs or wholesale fixed call origination absent ex ante regulation. 
In a number of member states, incumbents would not have provided 
wholesale broadband access without regulatory intervention. Similarly, jointly 
dominant firms may tacitly collude by not providing wholesale services. For 
example, it has been argued that the leading mobile operators in some 
countries may tacitly collude in not providing wholesale access and call 
origination on their networks. This raises the question whether a notional 
wholesale market can be constructed in countries, where wholesale services 
have not been mandated in the past and commercial wholesale transactions 
do not exist. 
The market definition exercise has to be based on a Greenfield 
approach, i.e., carried out under the assumption of competitive products and 
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prices and absence of ex ante regulation through the SMP mechanism for 
the wholesale service in question. It is therefore necessary to establish 
whether, in such circumstances, commercial wholesale offerings would have 
developed. Under competitive conditions, the upstream (network) and 
downstream (retail) divisions of vertically integrated firms would earn a 
normal return. If a new entrant (non-integrated) downstream operator were 
more cost efficient than the downstream arm of the integrated operator(s), or 
if it could market retail services to a wider range of customers, it would 
request a wholesale product from the vertically integrated operator(s). Given 
that the new entrant would be able to offer terms that would increase the 
vertically integrated operator’s return, it may be able to reach a commercial 
agreement for the wholesale service. It can therefore be argued that under 
competitive conditions, a vertically integrated operator would have an 
incentive to offer a wholesale product to third parties. It is worth noting that 
this result holds only if the new entrant has some sort of advantage over the 
incumbent’s downstream arm and that the incumbent’s economies from a 
vertically integrated value chain do not outweigh this advantage. 
If commercial wholesale offerings were likely to develop under 
competitive market conditions, it would be justified to construct a notional 
relevant wholesale market and include the self provided inputs of existing 
operators. For example, where commercial wholesale broadband access 
services do not exist, the (notional) wholesale broadband access market 
may include the self-provided bitstream of the incumbent and of rival cable 
operators; or, in the absence of commercial wholesale mobile access and 
call origination services, the relevant wholesale market may include the self 
originated calls of licensed mobile operators.  
Relevance of retail demand substitution  
Where the incumbent is the only provider of wholesale services, and 
where neither wholesale demand nor wholesale supply substitution puts a 
competitive constraint on the pricing behaviour, there may still be an indirect 
pricing constraint from the retail level. A hypothetical monopolist test would 
be carried out under the assumption of competitive products and prices in 
the value chain. Retail prices can be regarded as being comprised of a 
number of input costs. If the price of a wholesale input is raised, the prices of 
the retail products that are based on the wholesale input increase as well. 
Retail customers may switch to other retail products based on self supplied 
inputs. For example, consumers may substitute broadband internet access 
provided by the incumbent or a cable operator for a product of a wholesale 
broadband access (WBA) based competitor, whose retail price rises as a 
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result of an increase in the price of WBA. If retail customers substitute the 
retail product based on the self supplied input for the retail product based on 
the wholesale input, there is a corresponding effect on the upstream input 
level: The self supplied input replaces the wholesale input.  
The cost share of the wholesale input is of major importance to the 
strength of the indirect pricing constraint. The impact of the wholesale price 
increase on wholesale demand is diluted if the cost share is too low. Other 
things being equal, the lower the cost share, the lower the increase of the 
retail price, and the lower the reduction of demand for the wholesale based 
retail product. As a rule of thumb, only where the share of the wholesale 
input in the retail price is over 50 % does the indirect pricing constraint 
appear to become large enough. This may be the case, for example, for ULL 
and WBA. If the indirect pricing constraint from retail demand substitution is 
found to be strong enough, self supply of competitors and the incumbent 
should be included in the relevant wholesale market. 
Establishing susceptibility to ex ante regulation 
Identifying the relevant markets to be considered for ex ante regulation 
involves two issues: firstly, how to sequence the tests of markets in order to 
minimise the amount of ex ante regulation, and secondly, how to test a given 
market for susceptibility to ex ante regulation. The approach taken in the 
Economic Experts Report relies upon a linkage between defects in 
competition in wholesale and retail markets. If competition problems emerge 
in an end-to-end market for the supply of a service to end-users, it must be 
possible to locate them in the value chain. Equally, if competition problems 
arise in the value chain, they would be reflected in an end-to-end regime for 
the supply of a service. 
Sequencing of tests 
In order to identify competition problems in retail markets and locate their 
source in the value chain(s), a modified Greenfield approach is applied. This 
means that all SMP regulations in the value chain are initially assumed to be 
absent. By contrast, all regulations which are unrelated to SMP in the value 
chain are assumed to be maintained. The latter include, for example, 
general obligations to offer interconnection and number portability, which 
apply to all operators connecting end-users. 
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The initial step in a modified Greenfield analysis is to identify those retail 
markets for electronic communications services which on an end-to-end 
basis – absent ex ante regulation at both retail and wholesale levels – are 
likely to be characterised by competition problems that justify the imposition 
of ex ante regulations (see the following section for an explanation of the test 
itself). 
However, where such markets are "emerging markets", any competition 
problems should not be addressed by ex ante regulation even if there is a 
first mover advantage. If new products create a new retail market which is 
also an "emerging market", both the retail market and the related wholesale 
markets (to the extent that they provide inputs for the retail product) should 
not be subjected to ex ante regulation. The Draft Revised Recommendation 
defines emerging markets roughly as markets, "where due to their novelty it 
is impossible to apply the 3 criteria", but greater precision seems to be 
warranted. 
Where retail markets (which are not emerging markets) are characterised 
by market failures on an end-to-end basis, the source of such problems is 
localised in the value chain. Where alternative wholesale inputs can be 
ranked in terms of increasing replicability, the least replicable input should 
be examined first. Where there are problems in ranking inputs in terms of 
replicability, an alternative is to rank them in terms of increasing functional 
coverage. The least inclusive input should then be examined first. Table 1 
shows the ranking for various value chains. 
Table 1 – Ranking of assets 
Value chain Ranking 
Fixed narrowband access ULL – Retailing 
Fixed narrowband calls Termination – ULL – Origination –   
Local-tandem transit – Inter-tandem transit –  Retailing 
Fixed broadband Internet 
access 
ULL – DSLAM – Regional backhaul –  
National backhaul – Internet connectivity – Retailing 
Mobile services Termination – Access & call origination – Retailing 
Leased lines Terminating segments – Trunk segments – Retailing 
If the wholesale market for the least replicable input is found to be 
characterised by competition problems that cannot be dealt with by 
competition law alone, ex ante regulation should be considered. The 
wholesale market would be made "susceptible to ex ante regulation". It 
should then be tested if regulation of this market would promote competition 
in the retail market in a way that any remaining competition problems could 
be adequately dealt with by competition law. If this is not the case, we go to 
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the wholesale input that comes next in terms of replicability. Only if all 
wholesale remedies are exhausted without sufficiently improving competition 
at the retail level, can ex ante regulation be considered for the retail market. 
Testing a particular market for susceptibility to ex ante regulation 
The approach taken in the Economic Experts Report is to examine 
whether there is high level of market power, notably SMP, and, where high a 
level of market power is found, to apply the three criteria for the application 
of ex ante regulation as outlined in the initial Recommendation. A market is 
identified as susceptible to ex ante regulation only if the three criteria are 
cumulatively satisfied. The approach taken in the Report is broadly 
consistent with the Commission’s approach, even though the latter focuses 
exclusively on the three criteria. 
High and non-transitory barriers to entry 
The Recommendation distinguishes between structural barriers and legal 
or regulatory barriers. A structural barrier exists when, given the level of 
demand, the state of the technology and the resulting cost structure are such 
that they create asymmetric conditions between incumbents and new 
entrants and impede or prevent market entry of the latter. For example, high 
structural barriers are found to exist when the market is characterised by 
substantial economies of scale, scope and density in combination with high 
sunk costs.  
It should be noted that while we go through the sequence of tests from 
less to more replicable inputs, the view on structural barriers to entry may 
change. When we carry out the initial test for an end-to-end retail market – in 
the absence of any regulation in the value chain -, structural barriers are 
often significant. If we apply the 3-criteria test at a later stage of the analysis, 
i.e., once we have introduced some wholesale regulation in the most 
upstream markets, the structural barriers in downstream markets (including 
the retail market) are mitigated and may disappear. 
A particular type of structural barrier is created by the need to 
interconnect in order to enable an end-to-end connection. The terminating 
network operator can affect competition adversely by raising a rival’s costs. 
This by itself need not lead to an absence of competition. For example, 
where the receiving rather than the calling party is responsible for paying 
any charge associated with incoming calls, the ability to raise termination 
charges above costs is muted by competition. 
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In contrast to structural barriers to entry, legal or regulatory barriers are 
not based on economic or technological conditions, but result from 
legislative or NRA measures. These barriers should be set at the lowest 
level possible consistent with public policy goals and regulatory best 
practice. This is often not the case, for example, where regulators have 
issued an unnecessarily low number of mobile licences. Legal or regulatory 
barriers may induce circular causation. As a result of poor policy choices or 
bad regulatory practice, markets may not function properly. Before legal or 
regulatory barriers are accepted as a reason to make a market susceptible 
to ex ante regulation, the NRA in question should demonstrate that it has 
used its powers to set the regulatory barriers to entry at the lowest level 
possible, or commits itself to do so in future. 
Lack of dynamic trends towards effective competition 
Besides high and non-transitory barriers to entry, there should also be a 
lack of dynamic trends to competition behind the barriers to entry. 
Prospective developments, such as convergence or the implementation of 
disruptive technologies, can affect behaviour in advance of their 
implementation. Established firms may lower prices in advance to make the 
market less attractive for such entry. Another example is mobile markets, 
which are characterised by high and persistent barriers, but where 
asymmetry and excess capacity can drive the market towards a competitive 
outcome. 
Insufficiency of competition law 
Finally, ex ante regulation should only be introduced if application of 
competition law alone is not sufficient to address the market failures. This 
may be the case where compliance requirements of an intervention are 
extensive (such as the need for detailed cost accounting based on the LRIC 
standard, monitoring of terms and conditions including technical 
parameters). Competition alone may also not be sufficient if frequent, timely 
or anticipatory intervention is required or where regulatory certainty (for 
example, by means of a multi-period price cap) is of concern.  
Applying the third criterion to a "representative" member states raises a 
number of issues. The efficacy of applying competition law alone will 
significantly vary between member states; it will depend on the legal powers 
as well as the capacity and competence of the National Competition 
Authority (NCA). However, lack of resources on the side of the NCA, a priori, 
should not be a reason to maintain ex ante regulation; rather Member States 
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should resource their NCAs in a way that they are able to fulfil their tasks. It 
is also worth noting that in at least two Member States the NRA has the 
competence to apply competition law with regard to exclusionary or abusive 
behaviour. 
The Economic Experts Report suggests that competition law alone 
should be sufficient to deal with the competition problems at the retail level. 
Firstly, NCAs should be able to deal with exclusionary practices such as 
margin squeezes. In any case, dealing with margin squeezes is assisted by 
ex ante regulation, where wholesale markets are subject to price control 
(retail-minus or LRIC) and other remedies. 
Secondly, the Report notes that SMP involving collective dominance may 
be better dealt with under competition law. The demonstration of joint 
dominance under the regulatory framework in practice requires evidence of 
current as well as of prospective behaviour. The standard of proof for joint 
SMP is accordingly high, and such cases may therefore fail the third 
criterion. Competition policy has the right tools to deal with abuses of joint 
dominance; therefore ex ante intervention at the retail level does not seem to 
be required. 
  Analysing a "representative" member state  
Table 2 summarises the results of an analysis for a "representative" 
Member State. "Representativeness" means that the modified Greenfield 
analysis is applied to stylised and somewhat simplified conditions that are 
thought to prevail in a majority of member states. The table reflects the 
conclusions of the Economic Experts Report 7.  
The first column shows the major retail markets for electronic 
communications services. The definitions are broader than possibly justified 
in individual Member States, where, for instance, a distinction between low- 
and high-capacity narrowband access or between leased lines up to and 
including 2 Mbps may be required.  
 
                     
7 The table omits wholesale international roaming as well as markets for transmission of 
broadcasting content, which have not been dealt with in the Economic Experts Report. 
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Table 2 - Analysis for a “representative” member state 
Retail market 
Competition 
problems absent 
regulation? 
Wholesale markets 
susceptible to 
regulation? 
Retail market 
susceptible to 
regulation? 
Fixed narrowband 
access (1) Yes ULL 
(7) Yes 
Fixed outgoing national 
calls (2) Yes No 
Fixed outgoing 
international calls (2) Yes 
Call termination on 
individual fixed 
networks (8);  
ULL; 
Call origination; 
Local-tandem transit; 
[Inter-tandem transit (9)] 
No 
Dial-up Internet calls (3) Yes Call origination No 
Leased lines (4) Yes Terminating segments;  Trunk segments No 
Retail broadband 
access (5) Yes 
ULL; 
Whs. broadband access No 
Mobile access and 
outgoing calls (6) Yes 
Call & SMS termination 
on individual mobile 
networks (10); 
[MACO (11)] 
No 
Mobile data services Emerging market No No 
(1) The Experts Report suggested separate markets for low- and high-capacity access, while 
the draft revised Recommendation proposed no split. 
(2) PSTN/ISDN calls and voice-over-broadband calls. 
(3) Call to ISP bundled with Internet connectivity. 
(4) Possibly separate markets for up to/including 2 Mbps (or 10 Mbps) and above. 
(5) Broadband connection bundled with Internet connectivity. 
(6) Also including outgoing SMS as well as international roaming. 
(7) High-capacity access relies on leased lines rather than ULL. 
(8) The Experts Report suggested a further possible distinction between termination of off-net 
calls originated on fixed narrowband networks, including termination of CS/CPS calls, and 
termination of off-net calls originated on mobile and broadband networks. 
(9) The Experts Report did not recommend to include inter-tandem transit in the 
Recommendation, while the draft revised Recommendation included it. 
(10) The Economic Experts Report suggested a further possible distinction between termination 
of mobile-to-mobile calls and fixed-to-mobile calls. 
(11) The Experts Report did not recommend to include MACO in the Recommendation, while 
the draft revised Recommendation included it, subject to further consultation. 
The second column shows whether each retail market, on an end-to-end 
basis, is likely to be characterised by competition problems under modified 
Greenfield assumptions.  
The third column locates the competition problems in the value chain and 
shows which wholesale markets should be susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
It is worth noting that terminating and trunk segments of leased lines are not 
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only inputs for retail leased lines; they are inputs for most other retail and 
wholesale services. 
The fourth column shows whether wholesale regulation is sufficient or 
whether the retail market should be susceptible to ex ante regulation as well. 
The analysis resulted in the following conclusions, which, with a few 
exceptions noted below, are also reflected in the Commission’s draft revised 
Recommendation. 
Firstly, in the absence of ex ante regulation, most retail markets for 
electronic communications services would be characterised by substantial 
competition problems if analysed on an end-to-end basis. Competition law 
alone would not be sufficient and some form of ex ante regulation is clearly 
warranted. An exception is the mobile data market, which, can be regarded 
as an emerging market (as the Commission has done), where ex ante 
regulation would not be appropriate. 
Secondly, wholesale regulation is able to cope with these competition 
problems. There is usually a wholesale remedy, or a set of wholesale 
remedies, which can improve conditions at the retail level to an extent that 
market power is sufficiently reduced and the three criteria are no longer 
fulfilled. In a sense this is even true for retail fixed narrowband access: while 
ULL is unlikely to make retail fixed narrowband access competitive, 
wholesale line rental (WLR) could fulfil the task. The fact that retail fixed 
narrowband access is still maintained as a market susceptible to ex ante 
regulation has formal reasons. WLR is not defined as a wholesale market 8, 
and therefore can only be imposed as a remedy to SMP in another market 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. The current practice is to mandate WLR as 
a remedy for SMP in retail fixed narrowband access. 
Thirdly, wholesale markets which are further downstream should not be 
susceptible to ex ante regulation. The reason is that replication of assets 
usually is easier. Core networks, for example, are easier to replicate than 
access networks. Self-provision of downstream inputs is also facilitated by 
regulated upstream inputs. There is usually no justification to mandate the 
resale of services, except in the case of fixed narrowband access (WLR). 
There is also not a strong case to make inter-tandem transit susceptible to 
ex ante regulation. Inter-tandem conveyance can be easily replicated, in 
                     
8 An exception is the UK, where Ofcom has defined a market for WLR 
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particular, using wholesale inputs (wholesale trunk and terminating 
segments). Let us note, however, that the draft revised Recommendation 
still regards transit services in their entirety as susceptible to ex ante 
regulation. Similarly, to transit in the core network, national wholesale 
broadband access, as far as the national backhaul part is concerned, should 
not be considered for ex ante regulation. 
Fourthly, the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination 
(MACO) should not be susceptible to ex ante regulation. There are usually 
three of four network operators competing at the retail level. Besides 
regulation of mobile termination, there is usually no further wholesale 
regulation required to move the retail market towards a competitive outcome. 
Where there are problems, the Experts Report recommended to deal with 
them under competition law. The draft revised Recommendation provisionaly 
included MACO, but asked for further input in the consultation. 
It is worth noting that besides the retail markets included in table 2, the 
Experts Report also examined retail markets for incoming fixed and mobile 
calls. Under CPP, termination of an incoming off-net call is charged on a 
wholesale basis to the operator that originates the call, rather than charged 
on a retail basis to the receiving end-user. CPP confers a monopoly to the 
terminating operator. CPP creates competition problems in termination, 
which also impact the outgoing calls market. I have therefore treated 
wholesale termination on individual fixed or mobile networks in table 2 as a 
wholesale remedy that improves competition in outgoing calls markets.  
Relevant markets under the framework are economic markets and should 
be technology neutral. Nevertheless it is clear that some of the analysis for 
the revised Recommendation has been carried out for a value chain that is 
based on PSTN/ISDN network architecture and related wholesale markets. 
With the emergence of NGNs, the value chain as well as wholesale market 
definitions will change. Traditional market definitions (for example,  
wholesale call origination, inter-tandem or local-tandem transit) refer to 
network elements which will no longer exist on an NGN. Since NGN 
wholesale products and interfaces are not yet fully specified, the 
recommended markets are still largely PSTN/ISDN based. It is, however, 
clear that the lifetime of the revised Recommendation is likely to be limited 
given the uptake of NGNs over the next years 
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  Deviating from the Recommendation 
The Commission has an important role to ensure the consistency of 
regulatory measures across member states and to promote legal certainty. 
Firstly, the Commission provides guidance on how relevant markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation are to be identified. Market definition issues 
are dealt with in the SMP Guidelines, and the sequencing of tests and the 3-
criteria methodology are explained in the revised Relevant Markets 
Recommendation and an accompanying Working Paper. Secondly, the 
Commission itself performs the sequence of tests for a "representative" 
Member State, whose results are reflected in the Recommendation. The 
analysis is carried out without consideration of the geographical dimension 
of relevant markets 9. The markets listed in the Recommendation create a 
presumption for NRAs, which they have to take "utmost account of." Thirdly, 
the Commission may comment on, and veto, the draft measures of an NRA 
if they deviate from the relevant markets identified in the Recommendation.  
A major issue is whether, as a result of the powers of the Commission 
described above, NRAs follow too quickly the Recommendation without due 
account of national circumstances. In this respect it is useful to distinguish 
between two cases:  
The first case is where NRAs may apply a market definition different from 
the one used in the Recommendation, but this does not affect the overall 
area subject to ex ante regulation. Gaps in the chain of substitution may 
differ between Member States or such gaps may change frequently over 
time. The Recommendation therefore has to rely on a broader market 
definition and leave it to NRAs to identify the gaps in the chain of 
substitution. NRAs may divide up a recommended market into several 
separate relevant markets, or extend the boundaries of a market beyond the 
ones foreseen by the Recommendation. Since the Recommendation’s main 
objective is to draw the border line between ex ante regulation and sole 
application of competition law, such fine tuning of relevant market definitions 
may not really be considered as a material deviation from the 
Recommendation. The practice is that NRAs can deviate from the 
Recommendation relatively easily in these instances, and they have chosen 
to do so quite often. 
                     
9 The framework requires NRAs to define the geographical boundaries of markets in the 
subsequent market analysis stage when particular product markets have already been 
designated as susceptible to ex ante regulation 
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The second case is where NRAs, compared to the Recommendation, 
significantly reduce or extend what is susceptible to ex ante regulation. They 
may identify a market included in the Recommendation (or parts of it) as not 
being susceptible to ex ante regulation on their national territory. Or they 
may identify a market as susceptible to ex ante regulation which is not 
foreseen by the Recommendation. In practice, however, NRAs rarely do 
so 10. Instead, there tends to be a bias towards follow the Recommendation 
even though national circumstances may differ from those of a 
"representative" member state.  
Even though the Recommendation may be based on a proper analysis 
and provide the right answers for a" representative" member state, particular 
national circumstances could warrant a different approach. NRAs that 
automatically follow the Recommendation are prone to two types of errors:  
• A type 1 error occurs if, as a result of the Recommendation, a 
particular market is regarded as susceptible to ex ante regulation in a 
particular Member State even though it would not meet the criteria. Type 1 
errors can occur if, from an individual Member State’s perspective, "old" 
markets are removed "too late" from the Recommendation or "new" markets 
are included "too early" in the Recommendation. 
• A type 2 error occurs if, as a result of the Recommendation, a 
particular market is not susceptible to ex ante regulation in a Member State 
even though it would meet the criteria given the particular national 
circumstances. Type 2 errors occur if, from the perspective of an individual 
Member State, "old" markets are removed "too early" from the 
Recommendation or "new" markets included "too late". 
Table 3 – Type 1 and 2 errors in relation to the Recommendation 
 Type 1 error Type 2 error 
"Old" market Removed too late from Recommendation 
Removed to early from 
Recommendation 
"New" market Included too early in Recommendation 
Included too late in 
Recommendation 
How can errors be minimised? It is useful to distinguish between old 
markets and new markets. There is a safeguard against the type 1 error of 
removing old markets too late: where markets are included in the 
Recommendation as susceptible to ex ante regulation, NRAs still have to do 
                     
10 An exception is broadcasting transmission services, where NRAs have defined separate 
relevant markets for cable and satellite (or a market for both), and considered these markets as 
not being susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
U. STUMPF 59 
a market analysis. They are not obliged to impose remedies if they do not 
find operators with SMP. This has frequently happened in the first round of 
market reviews. In turn, there is no safeguard against the type 2 error of 
removing an old market too early. If removed from the Recommendation, 
NRAs no longer have to carry out a market analysis and may abandon 
regulating such a market, even though this is not yet justified. This would 
suggest that the Commission needs to be cautious when removing markets 
from the Recommendation in case there is a great variation of conditions 
across member states. 
The situation is different with regard to new markets. There is no 
safeguard against the type 1 error of including markets too early, notably if 
such markets are still emerging. As such markets would usually be 
characterised by first-mover advantages, they are also likely to be 
characterised by SMP. However, such markets should not be subject to 
inappropriate regulation. There is also no safeguard against the type 2 error 
of including a "new" market too late into the Recommendation, since in that 
case the market may already be effectively foreclosed. In the case of new 
markets, where member states may significantly differ with regard to their 
development, errors are inevitable. A way out of this dilemma could be to 
remain particularly cautious with regard to the inclusion of new markets in 
the Recommendation, but encourage NRAs to run their own tests on the 
susceptibility of new markets to ex ante regulation. To assist NRAs, the 
Commission could issue guidelines that further clarify the identification of 
new markets as susceptible to ex ante regulation and monitor the proper 
application of such guidelines.  
  Conclusions 
The EU regulatory framework requires a periodic review of markets 
susceptible to ex ante regulation based on a methodology that limits ex ante 
intervention to cases where it benefits consumers and addresses 
competition problems at their roots. This approach is also reflected in the 
Commission’s Relevant Markets Recommendation. 
The Recommendation increases regulatory certainty and consistency 
across EU Member States. It may however also create a cost to those 
Member States that are characterised by conditions that substantially differ 
from those prevailing in a "representative" Member State on which the 
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Recommendation is based. Guided by the list of recommended markets, 
such Member States may regulate (or not regulate) a market even though a 
proper analysis based on national circumstances would suggest the 
opposite. Such types of errors may be reduced if the Commission, whenever 
there is a large variation of conditions across Member States, is cautious in 
removing "old" markets from, and adding "new" markets to the 
Recommendation and at the same time encourages NRAs to carry out their 
own 3-criteria test. 
 
